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"AT 2:20 A.M. ON MAY 1, 1962, while riding his bicycle along the
Simferopol' Highway in the company of Baturin, Pronin fell and in-
jured his shoulder. Leaving his bicycle with Pronin, Baturin went on
foot to a nearby village to summon medical aid. Pronin waited for him
for awhile, and then decided to go back to the village of Volosovo in a
passing car. Seeing the Tula-Moscow bus coming, he ran onto the road
and waved. The driver, Markelov, seeing Pronin run onto the road 50
feet ahead of the bus, swerved to the left, went into the left lane, and
struck a Volga automobile driven by Tabulin coming in the opposite
direction.
"Auto experts established that the bus driver, Markelov, had violated
Article 2 of the Traffic Rules for Streets and Roads of the USSR. His
violation was caused by improper acts of the pedestrian, Pronin, who
created the dangerous situation.
"Autobase No. 12 of the Autopark Administration, the owner of the
Volga, sued Tabulin for 576 rubles, asserting that he had rented the car
and damaged it.
"The People's Court of Krasnopresnensk Region gave judgment for
576 rubles in favor of Autobase No. 12 against Tabulin for the damage
inflicted.
"Tabulin sued the owner of the bus, Motor Transport Unit 21 of the
Tula Auto Trust, and Pronin, for reimbursement in this amount.
"The Tula District Court gave judgment in favor of Tabulin against
Unit 21 for 576 rubles. [The Court does not mention any judgment
against Pronin.]
"The Court College for Civil Matters of the Supreme Court of the
RSFSR, in its decision of March 28, 1963, left the decision unchanged
and rejected the appeal of Unit 21.
"In its decision, the Court pointed out the following.
"According to Article 90 of the Fundamental Principles of Civil
Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics, organizations and
citizens whose activity is connected with a source of increased danger
for those in the vicinity are obligated to compensate for injury caused
by such source, unless they can show that the injury was caused by
irresistible force or the intent of the injured party.
"The owner of the bus was Unit 21. Therefore, it is obligated to
compensate for the injury caused by this source of increased danger.
"The fact that the collision occurred as a result of the creation of a
dangerous situation by Pronin does not free Unit 21 from the obliga-
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tion to compensate for the injury, since such an obligation also arises
under Article 90 of the above-mentioned Principles in those instances
in which the culpable conduct of a third party has contributed to the
causing of an injury." 1
This recent Soviet case is a typical example of the role that con-
temporary tort law plays in the Soviet Union. Contrary to the expectations
of the early Marxists, familiar concepts of civil liability continue to be used
to work out compensation patterns for traffic accidents, industrial injuries
and governmental torts, not to mention stones thrown by children through
neighbors' windows.
We might expect, as the early Marxists did, that in a state which pro-
claims its intention to care for all its citizens in all ways, the various risks
and duties reflected in our private law of tort would have been swallowed
up in one grand scheme of state compensation from public funds, coupled,
perhaps, with criminal or financial sanctions against those who cause harm
by deviations from the established norms of conduct. Whatever the theoreti-
cal desirability of such a system might be, it has never been introduced in the
Soviet Union. During the early years of the regime, the means to do so were
lacking, and indications in recent years are that there is no desire to alter
radically the more traditional system which has evolved.2
Certain broad social programs have had an influence on the scope of
tort recovery.3 Medical care is provided free of charge for the whole popu-
lation, though some fringe medical services are paid for by the individual.
Broad pension programs and benefits for unemployment caused by sickness
or injury are provided for most people with regular employment, but not for
housewives, children, or some self-employed persons and farmers.4 Even
those who are covered receive in benefits only a part of wages lost in the
case of permanent injury, and must resort to a normal tort recovery to obtain
full compensation.5 Property insurance is apparently common only in
1 [1963] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 7, p. 1 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
2 The new Principles are based on concepts of liability common to most modem
legal systems. E.g., articles 88 and 91 reemphasize the paramount role of civil fault,
and article 89 significantly extends the area of application of tort law as a basis for
redress against harm inflicted by official governmental acts. Regarding the role of strict
liability, see under article 90 infra.
3The impact of these programs on the personal injury recovery is set forth at
length in 2 IOFFE, SOVTSKOYE GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAVO (SoviET CIViL LAW) 500 (Lenin-
grad 1961) [hereinafter cited as IoFFE]. See also Hazard, Personal Injury and Soviet
Socialism, 65 HARv. L. REv. 545 (1952).
4 Similar benefits are provided on many collective farms from special funds set
up by the farm itself. 2 SoVETSKOYE GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAVO (SovIET CivI. LAW) 390
(Orlovskiy ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as ORLovsKIY].
5For example, in a recent case a man who was injured in an industrial accident
lost 80% of his capacity to perform his former work. He was awarded a pension of
150 rubles a month, while his former average salary had been 867 rubles a month.
He sued for a supplementary recovery in tort and was successful. Valov, [1963]
Byul. verkh. suda S.SS.R. No. 1, p. 17 (Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1962).
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certain limited areas, and liability insurance is not available. 5a In most cases
of personal or property injury, therefore, full compensation is available only
if applicable tort law will support a direct recovery from the person who
caused the damage.
Over the past 40 years Soviet courts and legal writers have created a
body of tort law, based, as is the rest of Soviet private law, on the civil
codes adopted in the Twenties.6 The unsatisfactory nature of the tort pro-
visions in those codes, caused by a combination of revolutionary zeal and
poor draftsmanship, quickly led to a situation where a major portion of tort
law was in the court rulings 7 and the textbooks.8 Recodification was de-
layed for over 30 years, and the court decisions show that it was almost as
difficult for the Soviet courts as for the outsider to spell out with accuracy
even the general principles being applied.9
In 1961, the federal legislature, the USSR Supreme Soviet, finally
adopted a skeleton code of fundamental principles of civil law.', This re-
codification, which incorporates 40 years of case law and doctrinal develop-
ment as well as some major innovations, will be the basis for individual civil
codes to be adopted in each of the 15 union republics. While there may be
some slight modifications, and certainly some variety in the degree of ad-
ditional detail included in the individual codes by each republic," these
Principles present already a fairly comprehensive picture of the shape of the
future law. They are about as detailed as the tort provisions in other modem
civil codes, and cover the grounds of liability, the defenses which are to be
recognized, and the scope of compensable injury. In addition, they include
5a See note 86 infra.
6 Citations to pre-Principles law will be given from the most important of these
republic codes, the R.S.F.S.R. CiviL CODE of 1922 (Kodeks grazhdanskogo prava
R.S.F.S.R.) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL CODE].
7 Soviet court rulings include case decisions like the one translated above, and
also general directives to lower courts. As the case translated at note 1 supra shows,
ordinary case decisions are disappointingly short on factual detail and careful analysis.
More helpful as guides to future decisions, since they are more likely to be referred
to by lawyers and cited by the courts, are the general rulings, which may treat a
specific point such as procedure for cases under a new statute (note 102 infra), or a
whole field of law such as tort (see, e.g., the 1943 ruling, note 8 infra).
s Basic fault liability, comparative negligence, and respondeat superior doctrines
were all worked out by the courts during the Twenties. The USSR Supreme Court
in effect codified experience to date in a 1943 ruling, reprinted along with other basic
tort material in DozoRrsav, ISTOCHNIKI SOVETSKOGO GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA (SouRCES OF
SoviET Civn. LAW) 806 (1961) [hereinafter cited as DOZORTSEV].
9 E.g., the confusion which arose over the standard for liability of organizations
for injuries to their employees, discussed at length in note 98 infra.
10 PRINCIPLES OF CIVIm LEGISLATION, Ved. verkh. soy. S.S.R. No. 50(1085) p. 1273
(1961). An English translation appeared in 14 C.D.S.P. No. 4, p. 1 (1962).
11 See, e.g., the description of the tort provisions of the new R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code
in Boldyrev, 0 proyekte grazbdanskogo kodeksa RS.F.S.R. (On the Project of the
Cisil Code of the RS.S.R.), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 8, pp. 15, 23 (1962).
[VOL. 1964
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provisions relating to workmen's compensation claims, wrongful death ac-
tions, and rules governing governmental tort liability.
This article is an attempt to restate in the form of an annotation to these
Principles the broad outlines of the contemporary Soviet law of tort.
"PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS
"PART III. LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
"CHAPTER XII. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE INFLICTION OF INJURY
"ARTICLE 88. GENERAL GROUNDS OF LIABILITY FOR THE INFLICTION OF INJURY
"Injury caused to the person or property of a citizen, as 'well as injury
caused to an organization, is to be compensated for in full by the person
who has caused the injury.
"The person who has caused the injury may free himself from having
to compensate for it if be shows that the injury was not caused through
his fault."
This article, together with article 90 which imposes a strict liability for
damage caused by a source of increased danger, provides the general basis
for tort liability in Soviet law.12 It is the basis upon which liability is predi-
cated in damage cases ranging from trespassing cows 13 to failure to come
to the rescue of endangered persons or property.' 4
Soviet writers say that the provision of the Principles to the effect that
a person is liable for damage caused by his act, unless he shows it did not
occur by his fault, states a general principle of liability based on fault. 15
While we might feel that the burden of proof of lack of fault imposed by
the section could lead to causation-based liability in practice, the experience
under prior law tends to support the Soviets' position.
Article 403 of the RSFSR Civil Code of 1922 provides: "One who in-
jures the person or property of another is liable for the injury caused. He
'
2 Articles 91 and 92 can also be read as establishing the general basis for tort
recovery for death or personal injury, but they simply incorporate by reference the
standards of articles 88 and 90. There was a doctrinal controversy on this point under
the old law which may continue, however. 2 OLovsKiY 387. See the general discus-
sion under arts. 91 and 92 infra.
13 The development of Soviet tort law after the revolution, from the first cases
involving injury to crops by straying cattle down to the adoption of the Principles,
is described in the excellent introduction to the chapter on tort law in HAZARD &
SAPIRo, TUE SoviET LEGAL SYsTEM pt. 3, at 72 (1962) [hereinafter cited as HAZARD &
SHAi'Io]. While none of the translated cases in that chapter involved direct applica-
tion of the 1961 Principles, they illustrate for the most part fundamental principles
or problems which continue to be of significance under the new Principles. Since
they constitute the most readily available source of Soviet materials in English
translation, citations will be given to them in the material which follows wherever
possible.
' 2 ORLOVSKry 397. See discussion at note 130, infra.
" E.g., Maleyin, Pravovoye regulirovaniye obyazatePstv po vozmesbcbenii vreda
(Tbe Legal Regulation of Compulsory Compensations for Damage), Soy. gos. i pravo
No. 10, p. 68 (1962).
SPRING]
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is not liable if he proves that he could not prevent the injury." The absence
of any "fault" requirement was a departure from the French and German
models which were followed by the Soviet drafters in many other respects.1
It is likely that they meant to lay down a different principle, for some early
Marxists advocated liability based on causation. 17 In any case, whatever revo-
lutionary element may have existed was lost in the court practice which de-
veloped under the section. By 1926, the RSFSR Supreme Court held that
liability should be based on a finding of fault, and pointed out that "Section
403 is by no means peculiar to soviet law, as the courts have often indicated
in their decisions, but has been borrowed from the civil law of capitalist
codes (e.g., the French Code)." 18
In other words, whatever the original intent of the drafters of section
403 was, the Supreme Court, and subsequently the writers, read into the
phrase "could not prevent the injury" a general "fault" basis for liability,
thus bringing Soviet law into line with other modern systems.' 9 The use
of the word "fault" in the Principles, therefore, simply continues prior
practice.
The interesting thing is that the drafters of the new Principles continued
the burden-of-proof pattern of the prior law, under which the defendant
must prove that he was not at fault in causing the injury.20 The repetition
of the old formula with simply the addition of the word "fault" in the
generally conservative draft was understandable, but its retention in the final
form adopted is surprising, for there was very free and detailed criticism
of the draft for an extended period. The most forceful suggestion made on
this point was that the section should read, "unless an absence of fault on his
part is established," 21 thereby avoiding the imposition of any specific burden
of proof, but even this compromise was not adopted.
26For a short description of the French and German provisions, see RYAN, IN-
TnODUCTION TO THE CIVIL LAW 111 (1962).7 The views of the drafters are discussed in 1 GsovsKi, SOVMT CWI LAW 496
(1948) [hereinafter cited as GsovsKIl. Gsovski points out that the formulation of
the general principle in Tsarist law, also different from the continental models, was
similar to the one adopted by the Soviets in that it did not specifically mention
"fault," and this may have influenced their choice of language. Id. at 494-95. Both
provisions were interpreted by the courts, however, to imply a fault basis of
liability.
'sQuoted in I GsovsKi 485.
19 Of course this refers only to the general basis of liability. Through devices
such as res ipsa loquitur shifts can be made in this basic pattern, and modern systems
commonly have special areas in which liability without fault is imposed. See the de-
scription of French and German law in RYAN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 120. The
Soviet provisions are discussed under art. 90 infra.
20The burden of proving that the defendant "caused" the injury is clearly on
the plaintiff.
2a loffe, et al., 0 proyekte osnov grazhdanskogo zakonodatepstva Soyuza SSR i
Soyuznykb Respublik (Concerning the Draft for the Foundations of Civil Legislation
of the Soviet Union and Union Republics), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 2, pp. 93, 100 (1961).
[VOL. 1964
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. Perhaps familiarity with the practice under the old rule made it clear to
those concerned that the change was not of real importance.2 2 The general
civilian principle of very free evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges
which is followed, coupled with the duty imposed on the Soviet judge to
pursue an active role in ascertaining all the facts of the matter before him,
creates an atmosphere in which technical burden-of-proof formulations do
not have the importance which we might attach to them.
The application of the present rule in practice is described in the
standard civil law textbook as follows:
"Under this article, the victim is not required to prove that the
injury arose through the fault of the inflictor. The inflictor, provided
he wants to be relieved of liability, must himself prove that he was not
at fault in inflicting the injury. Thus, a person who has inflicted injury
is presumed to have been at fault until he rebuts this presumption. The
position of the victim in the civil trial is thereby made easier. The pre-
sumption of fault on the part of the inflictor may not correspond to
reality, yet he may not be in a position to rebut it. In such a case, the
court itself must take steps to clarify the actual nature of the interrela-
tionships of the parties( Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Be-
cause of this, the distribution of the burden of proof provided for in
Article 403 is of only relative importance." 23
In view of the fact that the provision mentioned above imposing on the
trial judge a duty to investigate all aspects of the case is continued in article
16 of the new Principles of Civil Procedure, 24 the position seems to remain
basically the same as under prior law.
The ordinary basis of tort liability in Soviet law seems to be, therefore,
(1) an injury to a person or property, coupled with (2) a finding of the
cause in fact thereof,25 and (3) a finding of "fault" on the part of the person
22 It is also possible that real pressure for reformulation on this was felt to con-
stitute unnecessary criticism of the draft, and that it was best to concentrate on
changes where basic principles were involved, e.g., art. 89.
z 232 OrOvsKrv 375. The author would like to acknowledge the able assistance
of Raymond Stults, M.A. in Russian Studies, Harvard, a second year student at the
University of Michigan Law School, in the preparation of first drafts of the trans-
lation of this and some other text materials quoted in this article, as well as for as-
sistance in final checking of the manuscript before publication. W.G.
24 Ved. verkh. soy. SSR No. 50 (1085), pp. 1307, 1310 (1961). Cf. also the special
instruction to courts examining cases of damage done by workers to investigate
thoroughly the circumstances of the case. Para. 1, USSR Supreme Court Plenum Ruling
of Dec. 18, 1961, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. 1, pp. 12, 13.
25 Soviet cases tend to treat causation as a simple matter of fact, rather than to
use it as an additional test for defining the scope of liability. Perhaps the develop-
ment of useful causation theories has been inordinately hindered by the close con-
nection with political and economic Marxian dialectic. It has at least made the Soviets
extremely sensitive to any suggestion that their use of theories which look like cause
in fact or adequate cause tests have any similarity to Western concepts. See in this
regard the excellent discussion of the Soviet theory and practice in 2 IoFFE 447.
SPRING]
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who caused the injury. The "fault" may consist in a violation of a criminal
prohibition or in unjustified noncriminal intentional infliction of injury, or
in failure to conform to a standard of reasonable care.26
What is the nature and extent of the normal tort recovery? The Prin-
ciples simply state in this general section that "injury . . . is subject to
compensation in full," and no details are given concerning the intended scope
of recovery or the nature of the obligation.2 7 It is likely, therefore, that the
new republic codes will reflect the practice under prior law.
The standard civil law textbook says that under pre-Principles law,
"compensation for injury takes the form of restoration to the former con-
dition. . . . The law gives a favored position to compensation for injury in
the form of restoration to the former condition." 28 This is based on article
410 of the RSFSR Civil Code, which provides that "reparation of injury
shall consist in the restoration of the condition existing before the injury
and, to the extent to which such restoration is impossible, in compensation
for the damage caused." In other words, the Code establishes a primary obli-
gation to repair or replace damaged or destroyed goods, etc., and a secondary
obligation to pay damages.
This is probably not, however, in line with the actual practice which
has developed. The other leading civil law treatise says that specific replace-
ment or repair is very seldom applied in practice.29 In the case of personal
injury it is not possible, and, in the case of property injury, because of the
increase in the supply of goods for the people, "it is usually more convenient
[for the plaintiff] to receive monetary compensation." 30 Implying that a
choice is sometimes open to the parties, the text says that the defendant
sometimes chooses compensation in kind where the law imposes a rate for
monetary compensation higher than the value of the article, but that plain-
tiffs seldom ask for specific relief.31 Sometimes the choice has been made by
2 6 Conduct which results in liability is generally also characterized as "illegal" or
"unlawful." In practice this usually amounts to finding of "fault" or a basis for strict
liability, and does not constitute an independent criterion. The standard text says that
"in those cases in which the appropriate rules of conduct are not established by law,
the norms of liability for the infliction of injury are themselves the rules of proper
conduct." 2 ORLOVSKiY 369. In other words, whether or not liability is found is the
test of "illegality," and not vice versa. See the discussion under art. 88, para. 3 infra.
27 The special rules given in articles 91 and 92 in connection with recovery for
personal injury are discussed below and under those articles.
282 ORLOVSKrY 389.
29 2 IOFav 492.
30 Ibid. The result in practice under the German provision, BGB § 249, which
also provides for specific relief, is usually also a money recovery. 1 MOLITOR,
SCHULDREcHT (LAw OF OBLIGATI O S) 43 (1959).
3' 2 IoE 492.
[VOL. 1964
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the court, as in the case of a recent ruling regarding damage to crops of a
kolkhoz,32 and sometimes the law has limited the plaintiff to money
damages. 83
It seems clear that the secondary form of relief in article 410, money
damages, "has acquired fundamental significance in Soviet court practice." 34
In view of this, it is unlikely that the new codes will continue the old formu-
lation. It is more difficult to say what will be substituted for it. One com-
mentary states simply that "the choice of one form or the other (specific
replacement or repair or damages) depends on the particular characteristics
of the case in question, and it is therefore inexpedient for such a choice to
be made ahead of time by the law." 35 The problem has not been discussed
in articles dealing with the new draft civil codes, so this may be a question
which will be left to case law and doctrinal development.
The amount of money damages in the case of injury to property gen-
erally is described in the standard text as being equal to the actual decrease
in value or the replacement value in case of destruction."6 While the text
recognizes that there also may be lost profits from loss of the use of the
thing, it takes the view 3 7 that under recent USSR Supreme Court rulings,
these may not be included in the recovery. 8s
In the case of personal injury,8 9 recovery always takes the form of
money damages, and includes all expenses of caring for the injured party
not provided directly under the public health program,40 as well as lost
32 USSR Supreme Court Plenum Ruling of March 26, 1960, [19601 Byul. verkh. suda
S.S.S.R. No. 3, p. 11.
33 2 lorra 492.
84 Ibid.
35 IOFM & TOLSTOY, OSNOVY SOVETSKOGO GRAZHDANSKOGO ZAKONODATEL'STVA (PRIN-
CIPLES OF SOVIET CIVIL LEGisLAnoN) 164 (Leningrad 1962) [hereinafter cited as IOFFE &
ToisroyJ.
6 2 ORLOVSKIY 381.
37 Ibid.
3 The loffe-Tolstoy commentary says, "The tortfeasor is required to compensate
for all expenditures, losses or damage to property, as well as for all income not re-
ceived by the victim because of the infraction" (IOFFE & ToLsToy 164), leaving an
ambiguity on this point. There are a few exceptional cases of liability for more than
the actual amount of harm inflicted as an increased deterrent for certain kinds of
conduct. 2 IoFFE 493. There is also an important restriction on the amount of re-
covery by an employer against his employee to one-third of the employee's salary,
unless his acts constituted a crime. LABOR CODE art. 83. The broader provisions for
equitable reduction of the amount of recovery by the court available in all cases are
discussed in 2 loFFE 493 with respect to prior law, and under article 93 of the Principles
infra.
"
9For general background, see the comprehensive article by Hazard, Personal
Injury and Soviet Socialism, 65 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1952).
SPRING ]
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earnings attributable to the injury.41 Recovery for pain and suffering is not
allowed.4 2
The recovery of lost wages may be either for the loss during a tempo-
rary disability, which can be quite accurately computed in most cases, or
may also include the more speculative item of impairment of future earning
capacity. This latter portion of the recovery must be awarded in the form
of a monthly payment.43 Periodic re-examinations of the victim re-establish
his right to continued receipt of such payment, 44 and either party has in
addition a right to petition the court for a change in the amount of compen-
sation in case of a subsequent change in the party's ability to work.45
Two kinds of capacity are generally recognized-general capacity to
work, i.e., to do manual labor, and ability to do the work for which a person
has been specially trained, i.e., his professional capacity." If an injured party
is found to have lost 30 per cent of his professional capacity, then his
monthly damage payments will be a proportionate sum of his prior average
wage. If he has lost all of his professional capacity, then his recovery will be
the full amount of his former average wage, less whatever his probable earn-
ing power will be from whatever general capacity he has retained. 47
4°See, e.g., Zolotukhina, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R.
Sup. Ct.).
412 IorFE 501.
42This is theoretically justified on the ground that there should only be recovery
for "property" losses, or loss of income which can be equated thereto. For the extent
of this "property" orientation, see the introduction to the whole law of obligations in
1 IomV 368. Perhaps the fact that Tsarist law also refused recovery for other than
property damage influenced the formation of the Soviet position. 1 Gsovsml 539.
43 2 ORLOVSKiy 392. Though this is a long-established principle, some courts still
feel the desirability of a lump-sum recovery. See, e.g., Kurbatova v. Pogodaev, [1961]
Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 5, p. 15 (Presid. Yakut A.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.), HAZARD &
Salmo pt. 3, at 97.
4ORLovsKry 392, E.g., Krylov, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 4, p. 2
(Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
45 ORLovstry 392. E.g., a judgment in the amount of "539 rubles monthly until
[the plaintiff] recovered." Bekhtin v. Factory, [ 1960] Soy. yus. No. 4, p. 83, Case No. 3
(Presid. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.), HAZARD & SHAimo pt. 3, at 98.
46The ramifications of the formulae used for computing the monthly recovery
have been one of the most troublesome points in Soviet tort practice and are beyond
the scope of this article. The basic problems are summarized in a clear exposition of
recent practice in 2 IoFFE 502-12.
47 A good recent example of how this works out in practice is Valov, [1963]
Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. 1, p. 17 (Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1962). The formula
applied there is the formalized estimate of future earning power through the use of
the percent of capacity lost and the prior average wage. The court goes on to say,
however, at 18, that if the guess is wrong, i.e., if it turns out that he is able to earn
more than the amount predicted, there will be applied to his total income, i.e., salary
plus pension plus this recovery, a de facto limitation to his average prior wage, and that
this limitation can be invoked by the defendant in the light of subsequent evidence at
the time of execution. This unfortunately seems to overlook the possibility of inflation,
effect of increased skill, etc., which could justify higher total income.
[VOL. 1964
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Articles 91 and 92 contain a special provision which makes it clear that
assistance and pensions actually being received by the plaintiff because of
the injury sued upon are to be deducted from any recovery against the
person with tort liability, but that benefits from other sources, e.g., veterans'
benefits, are to be disregarded. In the past there had been some difference
of opinion on this point, based on the idea that a person's full income ex-
pectation from labor should be the upper limit of his recovery. It is inter-
esting that the Principles have reaffirmed the more favorable position for
the individual, i.e., that he may have his full work income, and in addition
any other benefits to which he is entitled.48
Some Soviet writers seem to favor a more comprehensive personal in-
jury recovery. There has been criticism, for example, of the rule that loss
of general capacity to work is not compensated under existing law if a part
of professional capacity is retained. 49 The suggestion has been made that
actual income loss is not the only economic injury sustained, and that the
loss of ability to do housework or care for relatives, as well as loss of mo-
bility, etc., should be compensated in the future. 50
It is still too early to say whether the theoretical limitation to recovery
of "economic" losses, or the practical consideration of avoiding large re-
coveries which might unduly burden the production units, will keep the
scope of recovery within the more narrow limits of present rules. If the
scope of recovery is expanded, however, it will mean that even claims for
temporary disability would not be fully covered by the social insurance
salary payments, and so would require a tort claim to secure full compensa-
tion.
"An organization must compensate for injury caused through the
fault of its employees in the performance of their duties."
4 E.g., applying article 91 of the Principles, Klopyzhnikov, [1962] Byul. verkh.
suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 10, p. 10 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.). The same rule had
been applied under the prior provisions, e.g., Likhachev, [1960] Byul. verkh. suda
R.S.F.S.R. No. 1, p. 15 (Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1959). A holding also resulting
in a favorable recovery in the case of suit by dependents declared it improper to
deduct income tax from the amount of the breadwinner's income before fixing the
amount of dependents' recovery based thereon. Veselova, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda
R.S.F.S.R. No. 6, pp. 35, 36 (Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.). However, the tendency to restrict
the amount of recovery is evidenced by other recent decisions refusing to allow the
inclusion of other than regular salary income in computing prior average earnings.
Shulkina, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 2, p. 2 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.
1961); Korostyleva, [19621 Byul. verkh, suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 11, p. 14 (Presid. Dagestan
A.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.). See 2 OR.LOVSKIY 394 to the same effect re exclusion of a collective
farmer's income from working of his private plot.
49 As applied, e.g., in the Likhachev case, supra note 48.
50 Maleyin, Pravovoye regulirovaniye obyazate'stv po vozmesbchenii vreda, (The
Legal Regulation of Obligations for Compensation of Injury) Soy. gos. i. pravo No.
10, pp. 68, 74 (1962).
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This provision resolves a problem which has been a source of contro-
versy in Soviet law. A clear provision on the point was lacking in the 1922
Code,5 1 and several views were advanced as to the liability of juridical per-
sons for the acts of their employees.
Some authors rejected the possibility of respondeat liability for the acts
of employees, and said that liability could be found only on the basis of
independent fault of the organization, e.g., an improper selection or super-
vision of the employee. 52 Most writers and many decisions, however, took
the view that fault should be attributed. 3 Some courts even held the organi-
zation liable when the acts in question were outside the scope of the per-
son's employment. 54
The Principles clearly establish liability on the part of the juridical per-
son for injury caused by the fault of its employees, and at the same time
place a scope of employment limitation on such liability.
Nothing is said as to the right of the organization to reimbursement
from the employee who caused the injury, but such a right will certainly
be recognized as it was under prior law,5 5 subject to the general limitation
of article 83 of the Labor Code limiting recovery against a worker for harm
inflicted by him on his employer to one-third of his salary,56 unless his acts
constituted a crime. It would also be available only in cases of "fault" lia-
bility, and not in cases where the worker by his act incurs strict liability only
for the organization.57
51 The only explicit provision in the 1922 R.S.F.S.R. CIvIL CODE (art. 407) stated
that government institutions were liable for harm caused by improper acts of their
officials in cases specially provided for by law. Re this specific question under the
Principles, see under article 89 infra.
52 E.g., the standard civil law text rejects the idea that fault of the worker is to
be attributed to the organization. 2 Ov~ovsKwt 384. Compare the German provision
in BGB S 831 which allows the organization to relieve itself of liability by showing
proper care in the selection and supervision of its personnel.
53 2 IOFFE 474. See also FLEYSHITS, OBYAZATEL'STVA IZ PRICHINFENIYA VREDA (OBLI-
GATIONS [ARISING] OUT OF THE CAUSING OF INJURY) 110 (1951), and the review of
authorities in Savitskaya, Otvetstvennost' gosudarstvennykb uchrezbdeniy za vred,
prichinennyy deyst~iyami ikb dolzbnostnykh lits (The Responsibility of Govern-
ment Institutions for Damage Caused by Actions of Their Officials), Soy. gos. i pravo
No. 8, pp. 48, 52 n.8 (1962).
5 4 IorrF & ToLsToy 161.
55 2 IoFrr 474-75. See, e.g., Timoshkin, [1961] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 2,
p. 15 (Presid. Sverdlovsk Oblast Ct.).
56 The limitation was not available under prior law in the case of government
officials sued for reimbursement in connection with governmental liability under
CIVIL CODE art. 407. There is an additional limiting aspect of this recovery scheme against
employees, viz. that the employer may be subjected to long term monthly payment
obligations, whereas recovery from the employee has to be in a lump sum. See
Timoshkin, supra note 55. The possibility of a limitation on recovery even where the
acts constituted a crime is discussed at note 119 infra.
57 Some of the strict liability cases have contributed to the confusion over whose
liability is used as a basis for recovery. E.g., in a case where a drunken employee not
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"Injury caused through lawful acts is to be compensated for only in
cases provided for by law."
This provision might seem to create an additional basic test of "il-
legality" for the imposition of liability. One of the leading Soviet writers
says in a commentary on the Principles that this clause means just that, i.e.,
that "liability for injury arises only when that injury is brought about by
unlawful conduct." 51 If "unlawful" is taken to describe any conduct which
results in liability under the circumstances, then this is obviously true.59 His
statement is misleading, however, if it implies that there is liability only in
cases where the conduct constitutes a crime or contravenes some general
regulation.6"
What is intended in this section is expressed perhaps more clearly in the
old RSFSR Civil Code provision, "The person who inflicts the injury frees
himself from liability if he shows.., that he was legally entitled to inflict
the injury." 61 This is designed, in other words, to take care of the situation
employed as a driver took a company car and had an accident, the court held that the
company had strict liability as owner. It went on to show, however, how the company
had been at fault (by an employee's fault attributed to it) in leaving the keys in the
ignition of the vehicle and in letting him get out of the yard with it. Lomov, [1962]
Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 3, p. 1 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1961). It would
be easy for a court in a subsequent case to interpret the holding as requiring a finding
of independent fault on the part of the company, or as attributing fault on the part
of the other employees to the company as a basis for liability, even though the court
must have actually decided the case only on strict liability grounds, i.e., liability without
fault, since only that code section was cited. For a discussion of the rule the court
may have been laying down, as well as of the precise question as to what interrupts
"possession" for purposes of the imposition of strict liability, see note 91 infra.
5 8 IoFFE & TOLSTOY 160. The question of whether there is a separate test of
"unlawfulness" for the imposition of liability is discussed in note 26 supra.
59The mere infliction of injury by an extra-hazardous source is described as
"unlawful." 2 OvLovsKry 369. One leading Soviet writer has objected to this. "It is
impossible to characterize as illegal the activities of Soviet industrial enterprises, rail-
roads and construction organization carried out in conformity with all the require-
ments of the law." Fleyshits, Obsbchiye nachala otvetstvennosti po osnovan grazhdan-
skogo zakonodatePstva Soyuza SSR i Soyuznykh Respublik, (The General Principles
of Responsibility on the Bases of Civil Legislation of the Soviet Union and Union
Republics), Sov. gos. i pravo No. 3, p. 34, at 39 (1962). He goes on to say, however,
that the new Principles, in order to promote maximum safety precautions, make the
mere infliction of injury by an extra-hazardous source "unlawful." Ibid.
'0 There is no need to show a violation of any criminal statute or other regulation.
2 ORLovsKiY 373. The civil court is bound, however, by the criminal court's verdict
where criminal proceedings are brought on the same grounds. id. 374. See, e.g.,
Daychenko v. Ostashkov, [19611 Soy. yus. No. 12, p. 27, Case No. 2, (Civ. Coll.
R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1960), translated in HAZARD & SHAPIRO pt. 3, at 81, where the court
even felt bound to refuse to find civil liability after criminal charges had merely
been dismissed for lack of evidence. Cf. Rubstov, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R.
No. 5, p. 13 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.), where the court cited in support of its
holding in a civil case the decision of a prosecutor not to bring criminal charges
against the defendant.
6 1 CiviL CODE art. 403.
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where cattle infected with a contagious disease are destroyed by order of
the appropriate authority, or where firemen inflict damage in the course of
their work." 62 In discussing this provision of the Principles, one Soviet
author used the two examples of injury inflicted in self-defense and destruc-
tion by an individual of property in cases of extreme necessity.6 3
The section suggests a related question which, while it has not received
much attention in Soviet literature, has become an important facet of tort
law in other civil law jurisdictions. 64 Even in a case where a defendant can
show that he had a "right" to do the act which inflicted injury, can he be
said to have abused that right, misused it, in such a way that he may be held
liable for the injury? For example, is there a limitation through some more
basic norm on the property "right" of a home owner to build a spite fence,
or does the above clause allow him to inflict injury in that way without
incurring liability?
The Soviets will certainly reject any such protection of absolute private
rights under this provision, and it is likely that either the right itself will be
said to be relative, or a general clause of the Principles will be brought into
play. Article 5 provides:
"Civil rights are protected by law, except in cases where they are
exercised in a manner which contradicts the purpose of these rights in
a socialist society in the period of the building of communism.
"In exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations, citizens and
organizations must comply with the law, and respect the rules of social-
istic communal life and the moral principles of a society which is build-
ing communism."
This is a continuation and broadening of article 1 of the RSFSR Civil
Code, which was inserted to provide a safety valve if attempts were made
to misuse the technical provisions of the Code during the limited return to
capitalism in the early Twenties. After a period of disuse, there has been
some revival of interest in it on the part of the courts in recent years.6 5
622 ORwOvsKry 372. In Makagon v. Ministry of Agriculture, [1960] Soy. yus. No.
5, p. 85, Case No. 2 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1959), HAZARD & SHAPIRO pt. 3, at 82,
bees were destroyed as a result of spraying of crops. Held, no liability since proper
methods were used by the Ministry of Agriculture and Civil Air Fleet, and all regu-
lations were complied with by the collective farm for which the spraying was done.
63 The same two examples are cited in a common law treatise as cases in which
"on supervening grounds of public policy a special privilege is recognized." FLEMING,
TORTS 6 (1961).
64 For a concise discussion of the development and application of the doctrine
of abuse of rights in French and German law, see RYAN, INTRODUcTION TO CivIL LAW 128
(1962).
65 1 IoFFE 20-22. There have also been indications of concern about possible mis-
use of rights in discussions of the new Principles. E.g., Fleyshits & Makovskiy,
Teoreticheskiye voprosy kodifikatsiyi respublikanskogo grazhdanskogo zakonodatel'
stva (Theoretical Questions of the Codification of Republic Civil Legislation), Soy.
gos. i pravo No. 1, p. 79, at 90 (1963).
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Whether or not this doctrine will be used generally under the new law to
work out a balance between public and private interests remains to be seen.
"ARTICLE 89. LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS FOR INJURY CAUSED
BY ACTS OF THEIR OFFICIALS
"Government institutions are liable for injury caused to citizens by
improper official acts of their officials in the area of administration in
accordance with the general grounds of liability (Article 88 of these
Principles), unless otherwise specially provided for by law. For injury
caused to organizations by such acts of officials, government institutions
are liable in the manner established by law.
"For injury caused by improper official acts of officials of the organs
of inquest and preliminary investigation, the procuracy, and the courts,
the government institutions in question are financially liable in those
cases and within the limits specially provided for by law."
General tort liability on the part of the government was recognized
under prior Soviet law for injuries caused in performing economic and tech-
nical functions."6 Injuries from hospital negligence or from being run over
by a car of the police administration were compensated for on general tort
grounds. 7 These claims were treated in the same way as those against pro-
duction units "owned" by the government, where questions of liability to
citizens for defective products, workmen's compensation claims, and tort
claims for accidents involving delivery trucks, were all considered to be
free of any claim of sovereign immunity.
A concept like sovereign immunity was only brought into play in con-
nection with official "governmental" acts.68 Article 407 of the RSFSR Civil
Code provided for liability in such instances only in cases specially provided
for by law.6 9 While some special provisions were later enacted,70 these few
isolated cases remained an insignificant exception to what became a well-
established principle of immunity for injury inflicted by governmental acts.
Soon after the de-Stalinization go-ahead given by the Twentieth Party
Congress, a leading Soviet criminologist, Strogovich, said that the time had
come "to decide by legislative action the question of compensating the
66Ruling of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum of June 10, 1943, para. 4, re-
printed in DozomRsEv. For a text discussion, see 2 ORLovsgiy 384.
67 2 IoFE 483.
68There has been considerable controversy, however, over what acts should be
considered economic and technical, and what considered "official" or "acts of au-
thority." See, e.g., the discussion re hospitals in Savitskaya, supra note 53, at 53.
69The original draft contained a provision for general liability in such cases,
but it was modified prior to adoption. Savitskaya, supra note 53, at 49.
7°The four principal exceptions provide for liability in connection with illegal
confiscation of property, certain injuries to collective farms, harm inflicted by the
fault of government harbor pilots, and liability of organs of the legal system for
property deposited with them. See the list with commentary in 2 IoFE 484-85.
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rehabilitated citizen for damages suffered through illegal subjection to
criminal proceedings, arrest, or conviction." 71 At the February 1957 meet-
ing of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a delegate from the Ukraine criticized
the old provision of Civil Code article 407 as being inconsistent with ideas
of "socialist legality":
"In connection with the preparation of the civil codes of the union
republics, consideration should be given to the question of the property
liability of governmental organizations for damage caused by their
workers. The current system has established limited liability. This
liability exists only in cases prescribed by law. Essentially, no one bears
liability in practice under Article 407 of the Civil Code of the Ukrainian
SSR. Such a situation contradicts the principle of strengthening socialist
legality and makes it a real necessity to broaden the property liability of
governmental organizations for damage caused by their workers. The
broadening of property liability will promote full protection of the
rights of working people and improvement in the work of the govern-
mental apparatus." 72
There was no immediate broad response to these trial balloons, and some
writers said that the question should be left to individual republic formula-
tion, despite the obvious general significance of the issue.7 3
Debate behind the scenes on the desirability of including a clause intro-
ducing general governmental liability continued, and the author was told
by legal specialists at the Academy of Sciences in Kiev in late 1959 that the
decision to include such a provision in the new Ukrainian Civil Code had
already been made. A similar decision seems to have been reached at a con-
ference held at the same time in Moscow at the RSFSR Ministry of Justice.
According to a summary of the proceedings published later, "It was pro-
posed that a rule be included in the draft of the Civil Code according to
which governmental institutions would bear material liability according to
general principles for injury caused by improper acts of officials." 74 While
71Strogovich; Teoreticheskiye voprosy sovetskoy zakonnosti (Theoretical Ques-
tions of Soviet Legality), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 4, p. 15, at 25 (1956). A full review
of the history summarized below of the adoption of the present form of article 89
is given in the excellent as-yet-unpublished dissertation by BERa', GoVNmErNrAL
TORT LIABILrTY IN THE SovuET UNION ch. VII (Syracuse 1963).72 Zasedaniya verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, (Session of the Supreme Soviet USSR),
4th meeting, 6th Sess., Feb. 5-12, 1957. From the Stenographic Record 500 (Moscow
1957).
73See e.g., Orlovskiy, K razrabotke osnov grazbdanskogo zakonodatel'stva Soyuza
SSR (Toward the Working Out of the Civil Legislation of the USSR.), Soy. gos. i
pravo No. 7, p. 81, at 86 (1957).
74 Shabanov, "Sovesbcbaniye po voprosam kodifikatsiyi grazhdanskogo, grazh-
dansko-protssessual'nogo i trudovogo zakonodatel'stva Soyuza SSR i Soyuznkb Re-
spublik, (Conference on Questions of the Codification of Civil, Civil Procedure and
Labor Legislation of the Soviet Union and Union Republics) Pravovedeniye No. 4,
p. 33, at 44 (1960).
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the report does not indicate the degree of support, Tolstoy, one of the lead-
ing civil law writers, said in 1960 that there was "unanimous" support among
scientific and practical workers for the introduction of liability for injury
caused by administrative acts, and cited in support of this the response of
the participants at the 1959 conference. 75
Conservative lawyers in the Ministry of Justice, perhaps armed with
direct political instructions from policy sources, still seemed unconvinced
by the reaction at the meeting, for when the draft was published for public
discussion in 1960, the provision had not been included. The draft stated:
"The conditions and limits of liability of state institutions for injury caused
by the improper official acts of their officials in the sphere of administra-
tion and judicial activity are to be established by USSR and Union-Republic
legislation." 76
The advocates of a clear statement of governmental liability in the gen-
eral principles were not daunted, however, even by what might have seemed
like a political rebuff to the group sentiment expressed at the 1959 meeting.
The provision was criticized from almost every side by eminent legal
writers, and the drafters were taken to task: "The compilers of the draft
of the Principles should listen to the voice of the wide scientific public and
of authoritative practicing jurists and radically change their approach to
the liability of governmental institutions for injury caused by administrative
acts." 77 A group article by distinguished civil law writers suggested the
following formulation: "Governmental institutions are liable on the basis of
the general [tort] principles for injury caused by the improper official acts
of their officials in the area of administration and judicial activity, except in
cases provided for by USSR legislation." 7s
When the final version was adopted as article 89 of the Principles in
December 1961, the battle was shown to have been won only in part. While
75Tolstoy, 0 proyekte osnov grazhdanskogo zakonodatel'stva Soyuza SSR i
Soyuznykb Respublik (Concerning the Draft of the Principles of the Civil Legislation
of the Soviet Union and Union Republics), Pravovedeniye No. 4, p. 33, at 44 (1960).
71 Draft: Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics,
art. 75, Soy. gos. i pravo No. 7, p. 3, at 17 (1960). An English translation of the draft
appeared in 12 C.D.S.P. No. 34, pp. 3-10 (1960).
77 Tolstoy, supra note 75.
7Sloffe, et al., 0 proyekte osnov grazbdanskogo zakonodatel'stva, (Concerning
the Draft of the Principles of Civil Legislation . . .), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 2, pp.
93, 101 (1961). Note particularly their suggestion that any exceptions to the general
principle could only be made by federal legislation. This additional safeguard was not
included in the final draft, although in some other articles, e.g., article 91, federal
control of exceptions was provided for. In an article commenting on the final version,
Savitskaya reiterates the need for federal legislation on the question of liability of
legal organs, where the article reads only "provided by law." The planned inclusion
of provision for liability in such cases in the RSFSR Civil Code would indicate that
federal legislation will not be forthcoming (infra note 80), although writers continue
to stress the need for uniformity (infra note 134).
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the essential principle was recognized, it was severely limited. First, only
citizens were given a right to compensation.79 Second, the provision ex-
cepted the activities of organs of the legal system-ironically, the very
source of original pressure for increased liability. 0
A balance sheet is hard to establish at the present time. Certainly there
is a potential basis for increased protection of individual rights, but the
Soviet jurists have been silent as to just what interpretation will be given to
crucial terms in the provision. What are "official" acts, what acts are "im-
proper," as well as what administrative remedies will have to be pursued
before judicial action is appropriate,"' all remain to be elaborated. So far,
the author has discovered no cases interpreting the provision, and an authori-
tative book-length commentary on the Principles simply restates the word-
ing of the provision, without interpretation of any kind.8 2
While the Principles make no specific provision for a right of recovery
by the government institution held liable against the official who caused the
injury, this was provided for even under old law and will undoubtedly be
continued.8 3
"ARTICLE 90. LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A SOURCE OF
INCREASED DANGER
"Organizations and citizens whose activity involves increased danger
to those in the vicinity (transport organizations, production enterprises,
builders, possessors of automobiles, and the like) are required to compen-
79 Savitskaya, supra note 53, at 50, interprets the provision to mean that organi-
zations also got the same "right," but that the statute requires a special procedure to
be set up for asserting such claims.
8 Provisions on liability of the organs of the legal system are likely to appear
in the republic codes. The RSFSR draft code is reported to contain a provision pro-
viding for liability for certain acts of legal organs if they are found to have been
committed intentionally or by gross negligence. Boldyrev, 0 proyekte grazhdanskogo
kodeksa RSFSR (Concerning the Draft of the Civil Code of the RSFSR), Soy. gos. i
pravo No. 8, pp. 15, 23 (1962). The suggestion that this liability should be provided for
in a federal statute to insure uniformity continues to be advanced. See note 134 infra.
8 Under some of the old exceptions, cited note 70 supra, redress was by ad-
ministrative action. One Soviet writer has assumed that under the new Principles,
claims may in all cases be taken directly to the courts. Savitskaya, supra note 53, at
50. Recent trends in adjudication of labor disputes and workers' injury claims, dis-
cussed at note 102 infra, give reason to expect, however, provision for some kind of
preliminary administrative decision and/or review, and a requirement that these reme-
dies be first exhausted.
8 2 IomFE & TOLSToY 163. The article by Savitskaya, supra note 53, is much more
detailed, but still stops short of elaborating just what would constitute typical situations
in which to invoke the new liability.
8 The liability for full reimbursement provided under the old act may be con-
tinued, even though an ordinary worker in such case would have the benefit of a limita-
tion to one-third of his salary, unless his acts constituted a crime. A suggestion to this
effect is made by Savitskaya, supra note 53, at 52. See the general discussion on reim-
bursement under art. 88, para. 2, supra.
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sate for injury caused by the source of increased danger, unless they
show that the injury arose as a result of irresistible force or the intent
of the injured party."
The parallel provision of the present RSFSR Civil Code reads:
"Individuals and enterprises whose activities involve increased danger
for those in the vicinity, such as railways, tramways, industrial estab-
lishments, dealers in inflammable materials, keepers of wild animals,
persons erecting buildings and other structures, etc., shall be liable for
the injury caused by the source of increased danger, unless they prove
that the injury was caused by irresistible force or the intent or gross
negligence of the injured party." 84
The Principles thus continued without substantial change the institu-
tion of strict liability for those whose activity involves increased danger to
others.8 5 The criteria are now, however, oriented towards the activities of
the persons, rather than the specific things employed. While it would appear
that the defense of contributory negligence has been dropped, it has merely
been shifted to the omnibus provision in article 93.
The fact that the institution of strict liability has been carried over in
this basic reformulation of general principles of liability presents one of the
paradoxes of Soviet tort law. In a society where public responsibility for
the individual's welfare is a dominant theme, it would seem natural to place
at least the unavoidable risks of modern mechanized society on society as a
whole, rather than on a blameless individual or production unit. Accidental
injury from the hazardous operations of railroads, construction machinery,
automobiles, etc., might well be compensated through tax-supported pro-
grams. Even compulsory liability insurance programs for the owners of
such sources would convert the onus of absolute liability into an obliga-
tion to pay premiums. To the author's knowledge, however, there is no
liability insurance available in the Soviet Union to spread the burden im-
posed on the individual auto owner 86 or the transport or production organi-
zation. 86a
While it can be said that this constitutes an ordinary business cost, and
is spread by being passed on to the consumer through the price of the
84 Cnvs CODE art. 404.
s5 The new wording makes it clear that governmental institutions as well as indi-
vidual citizens and enterprises are to be subject to strict liability, though this had already
been held to be true through broad interpretation of the old provision. 2 OLOVSKIY 383.
86 Recent tourists entering the Soviet Union in their own cars have been offered
liability insurance by the State Insurance Agency, but this does not seem to be available
to Soviets.
sa There are limitations on the burden itself, principally through the defenses of
contributory conduct on the part of the injured party, irresistible force, and the exemp-
tion from any strict liability for employers whose extra-hazardous sources inflict injury
on their employees. See discussion under arts. 91 and 93, infra.
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product or service, this is an effective argument only where the liability
is imposed on an institution aimed at end profits. It is not a satisfactory
rationale for liability from municipal snow-clearing activities, or from
the cautious operation of the private automobile. In the case translated at the
beginning of this article, the full burden of compensation was imposed on the
public transportation unit, with only the possibility of reimbursement from
a bicycle-owning peasant, and then only if fault on his part could be shown.
The rationale often advanced, that this increased liability is justified as
a stimulation for persons who control such sources of increased danger to
observe the rules of operation of such equipment and to take all possible
measures to improve the safety of the operation,87 ignores the fact that this
purpose would be accomplished by a rule which allowed a person to show
that he had used the utmost caution in employing his source of increased
danger, i.e., a rule which would exclude liability for mere accident.
In article 404 of the RSFSR Civil Code, the sources of increased danger
listed were held by the courts to constitute examples rather than an ex-
haustive list, and the courts added such important sources as automobiles.8 8
While the new list in article 90 is built on types of activity, e.g., transport,
certain traditional specific sources which have been omitted, such as wild
animals and inflammable materials, are still within the meaning of the new
provision according to the Soviet writers.89
It is important to note that these sources or categories of activity will
not always be considered extrahazardous. It is possible that injury may be
caused by a car when it is not engaged in its hazardous activity of moving
at high speeds. If someone shuts his hand in the door of the car, this does
not come within article 90. "An empty truck is a source of increased danger
only if it is moving, while a steam engine presents a danger if it is under
steam, even though not moving." 11o
Who is the "possessor" of the dangerous source for purposes of liability?
While there has been some doctrinal controversy, the generally accepted
view now is that "possessors" should be held to include persons using sources
of increased danger as owners or on the basis of some other civil-law re-
lationship, e.g., a property rental contract. 91 Employees using such sources
87 See, e.g., Fleyshits, supra note 53.
88 2 ORLovsKrY 377. While giving every auto accident victim a recovery without
proof of fault may seem drastic to us, a similar solution (though with some limitations
not yet recognized in Soviet practice) has been adopted by statute or worked out by
the courts in many civil law jurisdictions. For a description of the French and German
schemes, see RYAN, INTRODUrIMON TO THE CIVIL LAW 122, 127 (1962).
89 IOFr & ToLsToy 162. In an earlier article Ioffe and others had said these should
be specifically included. loffe, et al., supra note 78.
90 2 OLOvsKry 377.
91 Ibid. This includes an owner using it through his servant, and also seems to in-
clude use through someone who misappropriates the source (though perhaps only if the
owner is at fault in allowing the misappropriation). See the Lomov case, supra note 57.
Case law development is reviewed in a passage translated from an article by
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are not included, however, so that a hired taxi driver who collides with
another car incurs liability for his employer and not for himself under
article 90.92
The possessor may relieve himself of liability only by showing that
the injury has been brought about by an irresistible force,9 3 or as the result
of the intent or gross negligence of the injured party, discussed under
article 93 infra.94
This is an area in which there is likely to be a good deal of develop-
ment in the coming years.95 The liability imposed is a heavy one, and unless
liability insurance intervenes to equalize the burden, it would not be sur-
prising to see either a limitation imposed on the basic principle or a modifi-
cation of the recovery pattern.
Dobrovol'skiy, Novoye v sudebnoy praktike po delam o vozmesbchenii vreda (New
[Developnments] in Court Practice in Cases of Compensation of Damage), Sots. zak. No.
8, p. 59 (1960), HAZARD & SHAPIRo pt. 3, at 86. For the resolution in practice of the
complicated problem between organizations using each other's equipment, see 2 IOFFE
481.
92 The bus driver in the translated lead case of the article incurred no strict liability
for himself. 2 ORLOVSKIY 378 points out that he probably incurred no direct liability at all,
even if at fault, for even where there seems to be a clear element of fault on the part
of the employee, the strict liability of the employer has been held to be the exclusive
ground available for recovery. E.g., Collective Farm v. Okuneva, [1959) Soy. yus. No. 3,
p. 83, Case No. 4, (Presid. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1958), HAZARD & SHAPuRo pt. 3, at 85. As to
his liability to reimburse his employer if he was at fault, see discussion under art. 88, para.
2, supra. There is no limitation to use within the scope of the servant's employment.
Lomov, supra note 57, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Motor Pool v. Collective Farm,
[1960] Soy. yus. No. 12, p. 26, Case No. 2, (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Supt. Ct.), HAZARD
& SHtAPRo pt. 3, at 86.
9' See generally the excellent article by Matveyev, 0 ponyatii nepreodolimoy sily v
sovetskom grazbdanskom prave, (On the Concept of Irresistible Force in Soviet Civil
Law), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 8, p. 95 (1963). loffe states that this defense is rarely
encountered in practice. 2 Ioin 480. In the lead case, supra note 1, and in the Lomov
case, supra note 57, the court held in effect that intervening wrongdoing by a third
party was not such a force.
94 As to whether a defendant can relieve himself of liability by showing that there
is no specific regulation prohibiting what he did, the answer is clearly "No". His fault
is not at issue, and there is no "lawful activity" clause as under article 88 from which
the argument could be developed. The general conclusion of "unlawfulness" of the
conduct follows from the fact of liability. See notes 26 and 59 supra.
95 Some variations in the pattern of liability have been made in special statutes.
Article 101 of the new USSR Air Code continues the provision of article 78 of the old
Air Code imposing even the risk of force majeure upon the airline. The only defense
is the intent or gross negligence of the injured party. There is a translation in HAZARD &
SrAPmo pt. 3, at 87. A limitation on liability is provided in the provisions of articles 157
and 158 of the Ocean Navigation Code. While ships would normally be counted as
sources of increased danger, liability in the case of collision of ocean ships is made to
depend on fault. There is an English translation in 4 LAW IN EAsTERN EuROPE 23, 56
(1960).
96 It is possible for the courts to give relief in specific cases of hardship under the
general equitable power to reduce tort recoveries after consideration of the means of
the defendant, discussed below under article 93, though this is hardly a satisfactory sub-
stitute for insurance protection from either party's point of view.
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"ARTICLE 91. LIABILITY FOR INJURING OR CAUSING THE DEATH OF A CITIZEN
FOR WHOM THE PERSON WHO CAUSED THE INJURY Is REQUIRED To
PROVIDE INSURANCE COVERAGE
"If a worker is disabled or otherwise injured in the course of his work
through the fault of the organization or citizen required to make state
social insurance payments in his behalf, such organization or citizen must
compensate the injured party for the injury insofar as it exceeds the
amount of assistance payments received by him or any pension awarded
to and actually received by him after the injury to his health. Exceptions
to this rule may be established by USSR legislation."
This article purports to establish a separate pattern of tort liability for
the insuring employer, i.e., for the party who provided insurance coverage
for an injured claimant.97 In effect, however, it seems merely to limit his
liability to cases where there is fault on his part, and the same result could
have been obtained by including under article 90 a clause to the effect that
an employer has no strict liability toward his employees when they are in-
jured by an extrahazardous source under his control.
As the article states, an enterprise or an individual citizen (who may
employ a maid, chauffeur, secretary, etc.) whose employee is injured in
connection with the performance of his work is liable only if the employer
was at "fault," just as under the ordinary principles of liability of article 88.
This continues in effect article 413 of the RSFSR Civil Code, which provided
for liability in cases where "the injury is caused by a criminal act or omis-
sion on the part of the person making the payments." (Emphasis added.)
While the substitution of "fault" for "criminal act or omission" may seem
to be a major increase in the scope of employers' liability, court practice
had already reduced this requirement to one of simple "fault." 98
07 To the effect that the corresponding provision of prior law should be viewed as
setting up independent bases for recovery, see 2 ORLOVSKiY 387. In most writing, a
separate section is devoted to personal injury claims with these special provisions as the
basis for discussion. In fact, some courts took the position that since the tort recovery
"supplements" the pension payments, no tort recovery should be allowed where no right
to a pension was recognized, while other supreme courts took the contrary view. See
Anan'yeva & Laasik, Ob obyazatel'stvakh voznikayushchikb vsledstviye prichineniya
vreda (Concerning the Obligations Arising in Consequence of the Causing of Dam-
age), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 3, p. 101, at 103 (1961). Perhaps this separate treatment of
employers' liability was what led to the apparent claim in some cases that the employ-
ment relationship alone furnished a basis for recovery in tort. See, e.g., Barmotin,
[1963] Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. 5, p. 7 (Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.), where the
lower court had imposed liability on that basis without any finding of fault in a case
where a worker was injured on his way home from work. An apparently similar lack
of causal relation and fault was present in the suit brought in Neff, [1963] Byul. verkh.
suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 6, p. 4 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.). The claims were finally re-
jected, but the fact that they were brought at all and had to go through so many levels
of courts testifies to the confusion which exists.
98The Ioffe-Tolstoy commentary takes the position, at 167, that this new language
is a significant expansion of liability. The standard text states clearly, however, that even
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Far from expanding the employer's liability, the Principles are per-
petuating the exemption of the employer from strict liability toward his
employees, a position which has been vigorously attacked by Soviet writ-
ers.99 Absent a showing of fault, the employee must content himself with
his social insurance recovery, which is usually less, and sometimes nowhere
close to, full compensation. 1' ° A nonemployee injured by the same source
has a right to full compensation without any showing of fault.
The rationale given is that industries do not employ people to work
with ultradangerous sources who are not competently trained, so that there
is no need for the strict liability.10 A more satisfactory rationale might be
the fact that this is some compensation to employers for the burden imposed
on them to pay for comprehensive social insurance benefits for workers-
insurance which covers the strict liability situations, but which in addition
provides benefits even for sickness or injury which has no relation to their
work.
Since January 1, 1962, the supplemental portion of a worker's recovery
-that part based on the fault of the enterprise, has been subjected to pre-
liminary determination by the plant administration and review by the local
trade union committee. 0 2 Only in the event that either party is dissatisfied
with the disposition of the claim by these bodies is it to be brought to the
people's court. This procedure, which also applies to claims by dependents,
0 3
should not be confused with a workmen's compensation board award. This
under pre-Principles law "civil fault in the infliction of the injury on the part of the
person providing insurance is sufficient for liability to be imposed on him under article
413 of the Civil Code." 2 0RLOVSKIY 287. See to the same effect Dobrovol'skiy, supra
note 91. Court practice in recent years does in fact appear uncertain as to the standard.
For example, the old "criminal" standard was repeated by the USSR Supreme Court
Plenum even in 1962. Azarov, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. 4, pp. 28, 29 (Plenum
U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.). In 1961 the same test was applied by the RSFSR Supreme Court
Presidium in a case where no liability was found, Guba, [1961] Byul. verkh. suda
R.S.F.S.R. No. 4, pp. 2, 3 (Presid. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.), but in a more recent case the
Civil College of the same court held there was liability in a case where a worker was
placed in dangerous work while in poor health, apparently a case of simple civil "fault."
Krylov, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 4, p. 2 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
99 loffe, et al., supra note 78. Evidence of continued pressure for change even after
the rebuff through readoption of the old rule in the Principles is found in the letter
to the editor by Khvostov answered by Maleyin in Soy. gos. i pravo No. 4, p. 138
(1963).
10oSee the example cited in note 5 supra. Note that provision is made for excep-
tions to this pattern by USSR legislation, continuing past practice. Iom & ToLsroy 167.
101 2 ORLOVSKiY 387.
102 Decree on Procedure for Settling Disputes Concerning Payment of Damages
by Enterprises . . ., [1961] Ved. verkh. soy. S.S.S.R. No. 41(1076), item 420. There is
an English translation in HAZARD & SHAPIRO pt. 3, at 95. The ruling of Dec. 14, 1961, of
the USSR Supreme Court Plenum implementing this decree is in [1962] Byul. verkh.
suda S.S.S.R. No. 1, p. 8.
110 Infra under para. 2 of this article.
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is merely an introduction of mandatory direct negotiation between the
parties, followed by an appeal to a trade union committee, before the pos-
sibility of "judicial" determination of the same "tort" claim.10 4 The basis of
liability, the fault of the employer, remains the same, as does the scope of
recovery.
The effect of the scheme of compensation for work injuries is, then,
that the worker does get the benefit of workmen's-compensation-type quick
recovery for part of his claim through social insurance. He is then allowed
to get full recovery if he can prove a formal tort claim based on fault. This
part of his claim, however, is subjected to an administrative decision and
to the possibility of trade union committee review as outlined above before
it gets into the regular courts.
From our point of view, the lack of discussion of the possibility of mak-
ing the workmen's-compensation-type recovery a substitute for ordinary
tort liability is perhaps the most significant feature of the compensation pic-
ture. Most of the Soviet literature has taken the opposite tack; it has criti-
cized the continuation of the strict liability exemption, and would establish
a triple possibility of recovery for industrial injuries: social insurance, fault
liability, and strict liability for injury caused by an extrahazardous source.
"In the event of the death of an injured party, there is a right to
compensation on the part of persons unable to work who were depend-
ent for support on the deceased, or who had at the time of his death the
right to receive support from him, and also on the part of children of
the deceased born after his death."
This last part of article 91 of the Principles gives an independent right
of recovery for wrongful death to two groups of persons: first, those who
are unable to work and who were, in fact, dependent on the deceased at the
time of his death, i.e., those whom he chose to support; and second, those
who at the time of his death were entitled to be supported by him, even
though they were not in fact receiving support, including children of the
deceased born after his death. These people have an independent right of
recovery based on the amount of support they were in fact receiving or the
amount of support to which they were entitled.
The provision of the old Code was more limited: "Art. 409. In the event
that death is caused by an injury, the right to compensation belongs to the
persons who had been supported by the deceased and who have no other
means of support." By judicial practice, however, a right to compensation
104 For example, in a case where the administration declined to grant a recovery,
the worker took his case to the factory trade union committee and was also unsuccessful.
He then brought his tort suit in the people's court as he would have done before the
new system. After hearings in the rayon court, the civil college of the oblast' court, the
presidium of the oblast' court, the Civil College of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR,
and finally the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, he got his recovery.
Lebedev, [1963] Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. S, p. 46 (Presid. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
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was recognized in persons who, although not in fact dependent upon the
deceased, had by operation of law a right to receive means of subsistence
from him, i.e., minor children, and disabled and indigent parents.10 5
It is significant that under the new provisions, persons have a right to
support without regard to their means. This carries out the general idea of
the article that tort recoveries should not be limited to cases of actual need.
As pointed out above in relation to the basic right of the employee, the dif-
ference-money tort recovery in industrial accidents is subject to being re-
duced only by the amount of pensions being received because of this acci-
dent, and is independent of the general income of the injured party. 1° 6
In all of these cases the amount of compensation is determined accord-
ing to the portion of the deceased's wages which in fact went for the main-
tenance of the dependent or to which an entitled person would have had a
right.107 As in the case of recovery by the deceased, the amounts of any
social insurance pensions which these persons receive in connection with the
death of the deceased are to be deducted from any recovery against the tort-
feasor. Children retain the right to compensation until they reach 16, or if
they are still in school, until they reach 18.108
"ARTICLE 92. LIABILITY FOR INJURING OR CAUSING THE DEATH OF A CITIZEN
FOR WHOM THE PERSON WHO CAUSED THE INJURY Is NOT OBLIGATED To
PROVIDE INSURANCE COVERAGE'
"If a person is disabled or otherwise injured by an organization or
citizen not obligated to make state social insurance payments in his
behalf, such organization or citizen must compensate the injured party
for the injury according to the rules of Articles 88 and 90 of these Prin-
ciples, insofar as it exceeds the amount of assistance payments received
by him or any pension awarded to and actually received by him after
the injury to his health.
"In the event of the death of the injured party, there is a right to
compensation on the part of those persons mentioned in the second para-
graph of Article 91 of these Principles."
This article taken together with article 91 may be read as providing the
basis for all tort recoveries for causing the injury or death of a citizen. As
pointed out above, however, article 91 simply limits the employer's liability
105 2 ORLovsKIY 393.
o6 Text accompanying note 48 supra. It is only with regard to the means of the
defendant that the recovery can be reduced. See discussion under art. 93, para. 2 infra.
107 In a recent case under the Principles it was held that all who are entitled to
support are in effect necessary parties, and that even though they have not joined in the
original action, they must be brought in and their shares determined in order to allocate
the recovery property. Uvarova, [19621 Byul. verkh. suda RS.S.R. No. 12, p. 2 (Civ.
Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
1082 ORovsmy 393. E.g., Veselova, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. 6, p. 35
(Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.). No. 6, 35 (1962).
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to cases where normal fault can be shown, and the present article says that
where the person who causes the injury is not one who pays insurance
premiums, then the general rules apply, i.e., articles 88 and 90.1°
The only real significance of the article is the inclusion of what amounts
to a wrongful death provision parallel to the one in article 91. Taken to-
gether, they provide for an independent right of recovery for persons within
the protected group in all cases where the deceased would have had a re-
covery had he lived.
"ARTICLE 93. ACCOUNT To BE TAKEN OF THE FAULT OF THE INJURED PARTY
AND THE MEANS OF THE PERSON WHO CAUSED THE INJURY
"If gross negligence of the injured party contributed to or increased
the extent of the injury, then the amount of compensation for such in-
jury is to be reduced or denied entirely, taking into consideration the
degree of fault of the injured party (and where there is fault on the
part of the person who caused the injury, the degree of his fault as
well)."
This is in effect a reformulation of the court practice under existing
law. The RSFSR Civil Code provided in article 403 that a person who caused
injury was "absolved from liability if he proved . . . that the injury arose
as a result of the intent or gross negligence of the person injured."
It quickly became apparent that the clause either applied only where the
injury was wholly caused by the injured party, in which case there would
be no liability anyway, or relieved the tort-feasor of all liability if the
requisite fault or intent of the victim contributed to the injury, the effect
we give to contributory negligence. The court chose to introduce a scheme
of comparative negligence rather than to apply the provision literally."10 The
rules to be applied in cases where careless conduct of the injured party par-
tially caused or aggravated the injury were restated in the basic ruling on
tort law of the USSR Supreme Court of June 10, 1943:
"Para. 12. Where it is established by the facts of the case that the
injury occurred not only as a result of improper acts of the person who
caused the injury, but also as a result of the gross negligence or gross
carelessness of the injured party himself, the court may, applying the
10Some important problems regarding the employer's liability are not mentioned
in this section or under the general provisions. Under prior law, it was held that an
employer could not exculpate himself through a clause in the labor contract putting his
responsibility for careful observation of proper work standards on the employee.
Feoktistov v. Lumber Combine, [1960] Soy. yus. No. 7, p. 27, Case No. 3 (Civ. Coil.
R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.). HAZARI & SHiAPio pt. 3, at 93. The independent contractor status
is recognized, however, and if such a relationship is found to exist it is proper to in-
clude an appropriate exculpatory clause. Mokshin, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R.
No. 4, p. 3 (Civ. Coll. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
110 Gsovski points out that the Tsarist courts faced a similar problem and arrived
at the same conclusion. 1 GsovsKi 518.
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principle of mixed liability, impose upon the person who caused the
injury the duty of partial compensation for the injury in accordance
with the degree of fault of each party." 111
In practice, however, it seems that the courts have not usually under-
taken the kind of sophisticated comparison of fault called for by the Supreme
Court's ruling, as well as by the similar language in the Principles.1 12 In most
cases the court has simply made a finding of "mixed fault" and then pro-
ceeded to assess 50 per cent of the damages found against the defendant. 1 13
This is particularly inappropriate in view of the fact that the Soviet law did
not and still does not under the new Principles recognize simple fault as a
basis for deduction. 11 4 Since it is only gross negligence which will reduce the
recovery, in any case where only simple negligence on the defendant's part
is proved and mixed liability is applied, it would seem appropriate to assess
less than 50 per cent of the proved damages against the defendant. Practice
to date is probably a good indication, however, of the difficulty of weighing
simple negligence against gross negligence, or strict liability against gross
negligence, and no amount of additional guidance in the republic codes will
help to solve the problem. 115
"The court may reduce the amount of compensation for injury
caused by a citizen after taking into consideration his means."
The RSFSR Civil Code contained a provision to the effect that "in
determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for an injury, a
court in all instances must take into consideration the property status of the
party injured and that of the party causing the injury." 11 Under the
Principles there is now to be no such comparison, and it is the property
position of the tort-feasor alone (along with the fault or intent of the in-
jured party) which may be considered by the court as grounds for reduc-
ing the recovery.
"'Reprinted in DOZORTSEv 804, 807.
'"For example, in Zernov v. Factory, [1960] Soy. yus. No. 6, p. 84 (Civ. Coll.
R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.), HAZARD & SHAPIRO Pt. 3, at 82, the court simply states that both
parties were "negligent," and indicates no attempt to determine the degree of fault of
either party.
1" 2 IoFvm 500. E.g., Takhtambetov, [19611 Byul. verkh. suda S.S.S.R. No. 5, p. 21
(Plenum U.S.S.R. Sup. Ct.).
14 See cases cited in 2 Iom7E 499.
"1 For example, in Kosartsev v. Auto Transport Office, [1960] Sots. zak. No. 11, p.
86 (Presid. Kustanay Prov. Ct.). HAZARD & SHAPIRO pt. 3, at 83, the court rejected the ap-
plication of the idea of mixed liability entirely. The driver of the truck in which the
plaintiff was riding was speeding (and intoxicated) at the time of the accident, and the
court said that the lower court could not consider as grounds for a possible reduction
the fact that the plaintiff was negligent in riding in the back of the truck instead of in
the cab with the driver.
116 Civ CODE art. 411. Practice under this provision is discussed in 2 OaOvsxrY 39'
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A practice not too different from the new provision had already de-
veloped in prior law, for the courts had long held that the means of an
organization should not be considered under the provision quoted above.117
This meant that in many cases it was only the means of the citizen tort-feasor
which were to be considered. A statutory provision based on the same idea
was written into Labor Code article 83, limiting recovery against an em-
ployee who damaged his employer to one-third of his salary,1 " except where
his acts constituted a crime. Even this full liability where the acts constituted
a crime was made subject to the means test by a 1954 ruling of the USSR
Supreme Court Plenum,119 so that in effect the rules now embodied in the
Principles in article 93, that the size of the recovery should be determined
with regard to the comparative degree of fault and the means of the tort-
feasor, had already been widely applied. 20
It is still too early to say whether this provision might lead to a pattern
in Soviet tort cases of frequently awarding less than full compensation. It
seems unlikely that it will have so broad an application, for the basic pro-
visions in the Principles are inspired generally by the desirability of imposing
liability for fault in order to encourage careful conduct. It might be invoked,
however, to relieve the heavy burden of strict liability in extreme cases.
"ARTICLE 94. REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
"Organizations or citizens 'who are liable for injury caused by them
are required to reimburse on demand the organs of social insurance or
social security for assistance payments or pensions paid by them to per-
sons mentioned in Articles 91 and 92 of these Principles.
"In the event of a reduction in the size of compensation for injury
(Article 93 of these Principles), the size of the reimbursement is re-
duced accordingly."
117 Ruling of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum of June 10, 1943, reprinted in
DozoRTS Ev 804, 807.
Il The ease of the recovery provides some compensation for the limitation, for
the employer is allowed to deduct the amount directly from the employee's pay without
suit. E.g., Kuvaltsov, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 12, p. 2 (Civ. Coll.
R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.). For the procedure if the employee objects to the amount withheld,
see para. 2, Ruling of the USSR Sup. Ct. Plenum of Dec. 18, 1961, [1962] Byul. verkh.
suda S.S.S.R. No. 1, pp. 12, 13.
119 Ruling of May 28, 1954, reprinted in Dozoavsav 810, 811. See, e.g., Pochuyev and
Ogorodnikov, [1961] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 1, p. 12 (Presid. R.S.FS.R. Sup.
Ct. 1960). The Plenum reminds the lower courts once again (as it has in the 1943 ruling)
that of course article 411 is to be applied in all other cases.
120 In a 1960 ruling, the Plenum reemphasized the application of the general prin-
ciple in cases of injury to kolkhoz property by individual members. [1960] Byul. verkh.
suda S.S.S.R. No. 3, p. 11. (These claims are not considered to be employer-employee
disputes, but ordinary tort actions which must be brought in the ordinary courts.
Nikiforov, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.F.S.R. No. 12, p. 1 (Civ. Coil. R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct.
1961). In Korostyleva, [1962] Byul. verkh. suda R.S.FS.R. No. 11, p. 14 (Civ. Coil.
R.S.F.S.R. Sup. Ct. 1961), the appellate court chided the lower court for not looking
into the question of the defendant's means on its own initiative.
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This article gives to an insurance agency a right to reimbursement from
the tort-feasor to the extent that the agency has made payments to the
injured party or his dependents. The formulation is not a particularly happy
one. The first paragraph seems to say that if the person who caused the
injury is liable at all, then there is a right to full reimbursement on the part
of the insurance agency, i.e., that no reduction for mixed liability or limited
means is to be made, as would be done in the tort recovery. This was in fact
what some courts allowed under the similar provision of the old law, 12 1 so
the second paragraph has been tacked on to make it clear that this was not
the result intended. It might have been better simply to say that an agency
which has made a payment because of an injury caused by X is subrogated
to the extent of its payments to whatever claim the injured party may be
found to have against X. This would make it clear that all of the possibilities
for reduction under article 93 were to be applied in the reimbursement
action.
Such a formulation would also help to clarify the ambiguity created by
articles 91 and 92, and by the language of this section, as to the nature and
scope of the injured party's claim. On the one hand, under the language of
article 91, it would seem that there is a certain preemption of the ordinary
liability provided for under article 88, i.e., that there is no claim against the
tort-feasor on the part of the injured party up to the amount of his insurance
recovery. He has a right to the insurance payments without regard to the
source of his injury, and then a limited tort right to recover the difference
between this amount and his full damages. 122 In other words, he has no
"claim" for the amount of the insurance to which the insurance agency
could be subrogated, and it is therefore necessary in article 94 to reintroduce
a quasi-tort liability plus all the normal defenses in order to define properly
the scope of the "reimbursement" recovery.1 23 On the other hand, articles 91
and 92 seem to assume a full claim on the part of the worker which is re-
duced by subsequent insurance payments if and when received. Since the
insurance agency's right is only for reimbursement of sums actually paid,
subrogation would then seem to be the appropriate way to describe this
right to reimbursement. Article 94 might better have provided simply for
the transfer to the insurance agency, at the time a payment is made, of any
claim the injured party might have up to the amount of the payment.
It should not be overlooked that the recovery pattern laid down by this
I2l IoFE & ToLsToy 169.
122 In effect this interpretation supports the theoretical position of some writers,
mentioned in note 97 supr, that this is an independent scheme of liability.
122 The recovery pattern is in fact complicated by the practice of deciding reim-
bursement suits against organizations in Gozarbitrazh, i.e., the arbitration tribunals for
disputes among governmental and production units, instead of in the ordinary courts.
See Order of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Court of July 27, 1959, in [1959] Ved.
verkh. soy. S.S.S.R. No. 30, p. 163.
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article eliminates any liability "insurance" effect of the social insurance pro-
gram so far as the industrial enterprise is concerned. It bears full liability for
all injuries caused by its fault, and simply pays part of the damages direct
to the employee and part to the social insurance agency.124 The "insurance"
payments are in effect a tax on the employer to provide benefits for sickness
and accidental injury for which the employer would not be liable. They are
not used to provide the kind of workmen's compensation recovery which
relieves the employer of ordinary tort liability.125
CONCLUSION
The tort provisions of the Principles show that familiar problems will,
for the most part, be solved in familiar ways in the new Soviet tort law about
to take shape in the civil code of each republic. Fault liability has been re-
tained, and a significant expansion in the area of application of tort law may
result from the provisions for broad governmental liability under article 89.
Some of the "changes" in the 1922 Code provisions made by the new
Principles constitute merely a recodification of the extensive changes intro-
duced by the courts as conditions and legal thinking changed over the
years. 1 26 Others resolve doctrinal controversies or clarify provisions which
had given rise to varying interpretations in practice. 127
Some of the questions left unanswered by the Principles will be
covered in the more detailed provisions of the republic codes, while others
will only be worked out in practice after the codes are adopted. For example,
there are no provisions in either the tort chapter or the general sections of
the Principles relating to the liability of infants and others with limited ca-
pacity. Provisions in some detail on this topic are contained, however, in the
as-yet-unpublished draft of the new RSFSR Civil Code, 2 8 including a pro-
124 Employers receive some relief through being exempted from strict liability
toward their workers (see discussion under art. 90, supra.).
125 See the discussion on this point following note 104 supra.
126 Other examples of this type of "change" would be the wrongful death recovery
of persons having a right to support under articles 91 and 92, and the addition of the
automobile as an extrahazardous source under article 90.
127 E.g., the respondeat provisions of article 88, paragraph 2, the substitution of
"organizations" for "enterprise" in article 91, and the reimbursement provisions of article
94, paragraph 2.
IS2 Boldyrev, 0 proyekte grazbdanskogo kodeksa RSFSR (Concerning the Draft
Civil Code of the RSFSR), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 8, p. 15, at 23 (1962). Under ex-
isting law, liability of those with limited capacity is divided into two categories. In-
competents, including infants under 14 and adults who have been declared incompetent,
are not liable for their torts, though the persons responsible for their supervision
(parents, guardians, director of an insane asylum) may be liable if they can be shown
to be at fault in failing to exercise proper supervision. 2 IoFFE 487. Minors from 14 to 18
are liable for their torts. CIVIL CODE art. 9. There is, in addition, a joint liability with the
latter on the part of their guardians, although loffe cites a case where a court thought
it might be appropriate to relieve parents of this joint liability. 2 IoFrE 490. According
to Boldyrev, RSFSR Minister of Justice, the RSFSR draft provides that "schools and
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vision relieving a person under the influence of alcohol or drugs of liability
unless he was responsible for getting himself into that condition.129
One interesting question which will probably not be covered in the re-
public codes but will have to be worked out in practice is that of the duty
to rescue life or property. While article 131 of the 1936 USSR Constitution
establishes a universal duty to protect and strengthen common socialist prop-
erty, and article 130 summons all citizens to render assistance in those situa-
tions in which common socialist property and the life, health, or property
of another is endangered, no general provision for civil liability for a breach
of this duty has ever been enacted or applied in court practice. 30 The
Principles contain no provision for such liability, but they do provide for
an obligation to reimburse a person who does in fact rescue socialist prop-
erty, and even broader compensation provisions covering saving of life as
well as property have been included in some republic code drafts.'3 ' There
is no indication that the codes will go so far as to provide explicitly for
liability for failure to rescue, however, and the courts will probably have
to work out in practice the scope of the duty and the recovery for its
breach. 32
The area of governmental tort liability will undoubtedly continue to
receive a good deal of attention in the near future. The additional provisions
of the RSFSR Civil Code draft providing for liability of organs of the legal
system, an important area sidestepped by the Principles, have already been
discussed above, and it is possible that additional statutory regulation may be
forthcoming. The major question will be, however, the patterns of recovery
that the courts work out under the general liability provisions. This area of
contact between the courts and the "official" acts of government is bound
to be a sensitive one, and the actual recoveries allowed will be watched with
medical institutions are liable for harm done by infants under their control, unless they
show it did not occur through any fault on their part. The liability of parents and
guardians for harm done by minors without sufficient means of their own to make
compensation ends when the minor reaches majority or when he acquires sufficient
means." Boldyrev, supra at 23. While this only hints at the content of the general pro-
visions, it at least indicates that the subject of tort liability of incompetents and minors
will be covered in some detail in the forthcoming code, and will contain some modifica-
tions of present practice.
129 Boldyrev, supra note 128, at 23.
:[s While the standard text recognizes the basis for liability under the general tort
provisions, it is quick to add that "under Soviet conditions suits of this nature are
singular occurrences." 2 ORLOVSKiY 397. They are so singular that no case or authority
is cited for the statement advocating liability.
"' Fleyshits & Makovskiy, Teoreticheskiye voprosy kodifikatsiyi respublikanskogo
grazhdanskogo zakonodaterstva, (Theoretical Questions of the Codification of Republic
Civil Legislation), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 1, pp. 79, 91 (1963).
132 For an excellent discussion of this problem in Soviet law, see Hazard, Soiet
Socialism and the Duty To Rescue, in XX- CENrT-Y COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICrs LAW:
L.AL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HEssm E. YNTEMA 160-71 (Nadelmann ed. 1961).
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great interest by all countries interested in developing "legal" sanctions for
harm inflicted by governmental acts.
Some expansion in the scope of the personal injury recovery, probably
through court practice, seems to be likely, and it is possible that there will
be some satisfaction of the pressure for something like strict liability for in-
juries to employees caused by extrahazardous sources. This may come about
through modification of the tort rule, or may be effected simply by increas-
ing the level of social insurance benefits for job-connected injuries generally
to the point where they approximate full compensation.
The whole question of strict liability is likely to be re-examined to some
extent. Either some restriction will be imposed on the liability or the scope
of recovery in line with European patterns, as mentioned above, or liability
insurance will be introduced to spread the heavy risks of accidental injury
now imposed on the individual citizen or the governmental or production
unit.
These and the problems to be worked out in other areas of Soviet law
call for serious discussion by legal writers, and the most important question
of the immediate future will be whether the climate of relatively free dis-
cussion in which the Principles were adopted will be maintained. As was
pointed out above, there has been some tendency on the part of Soviet writ-
ers to return to a passive role now that the Principles have been adopted,13 3
and the temptation will be even greater once the republic codes are en-
acted. 3 4 It is probably too much to expect real criticism from Soviet legal
133 Ioffe, one of the leading civil law writers, for example, authored with others
a very incisive critical article during the discussion of the draft. The article made among
others five specific suggestions in the tort area-federal control over exceptions to the
principle of governmental tort liability, inclusion of liability of organs of the legal
system, inclusion of certain items in the list of extrahazardous sources, removal of the
strict liability exemption from the employer, and the inclusion of federal principles
governing liability of incompetents and minors-which were described as "necessary,"
"extremely desirable," or "shown to be necessary by prior practice." loffe et al., 0
proyekte osnov grazbdanskogo zakonodatel'stva Soyuza SSR i Soyuznykb Respublik
(Concerning the Draft of the Principles of Civil Legislation of the Soviet Union
and Union Republics), Soy. gos. i pravo No. 2, p. 93, at 100 (1961). All of these sugges-
tions were rejected in the final version of the Principles. In Ioffe's authoritative com-
mentary on the tort provisions of the Principles (Iowz & ToLSrOY 159) there is no
mention of the fact that there had ever been any controversy over these provisions.
While this may seem at least less than scholarly to a Western jurist, it is typical of much
of Soviet writing over the past 40 years, and is an example of how much favorable
light has been shed on the quality and quantity of critical thinking in Soviet legal
circles by the discussion of the Principles.
134 One of the most vigorous post-Principles debates has centered on the many
problems of federalism raised in connection with the enactment of republic codes and
related federal and republic legislation. The picture of interlocking USSR and republic
legislation presented by the Principles' constant references to laws and procedures to be
established at one or the other level (or both, e.g., "limited legal capacity of minors is
to be established by federal and union republic legislation" Art. 8) is far from specific
or complete. In the process of drafting the codes and implementing legislation, the
wisdom of some of these provisions themselves seems to have been questioned as it was
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writers of some of the basic policy decisions discussed above, but we may
at least hope that the fact that prominent writers took strong positions op-
posing some of the provisions of the Principles which were subsequently
enacted in spite of this opposition 18 will be taken as an indication of the
possibility of honest academic discussion, and not of the futility of reasonable
criticism. There is some evidence that they have not been entirely dis-
couraged, for serious discussion has continued over the provisions of the
republic codes, and there has even been some continued criticism of certain
of the provisions of the Principles.'30
Practice has not yet been significantly affected by the Principles, for it
will not be until the republic codes go into effect that real interpretation
by the courts will be possible. The crucial test of whether the recodification
process will result in improvement in the law as applied, or will merely
change the statutes, is still to come. While the Principles constitute a good
beginning, much will depend on the solution of other problems which affect
the application of the rules in practice, 3 7 and the kind of people who will be
attracted into the legal system in the years to come.
in the pre-Principles discussions. See the emphasis on the desirability of more uni-
formity than required by the Principles in connection with the capacity provisions
(discussed in note 128 supra) in Fleyshits & Makovskiy, supra note 131, at 83. They also
stress the need for uniformity in provisions for tort liability of the organs of the legal
system. Ibid. To the same effect, see Savitskaya, Otvetstvennost' gosudarstvennykb
uchrezbdeniy za vred, prichinennyy deystviyami ikb dolzhnostnykb lits (The Responsi-
bility of Government Institutions for Damage Caused by the Actions of Their Officials),
Soy. gos. i pravo No. 8, pp. 48, 52 n.8 (1962).
1s5 See note 133 supra.
136 See notes 99 and 134 supra.
137 The most crucial of these is the continued uncertainty injected into the judicial
process by the possibility of "review" and reversal ad infinitum of what appear to be
final decisions. Protests by a prosecutor or the head of a superior court regarding a
decision often result in a given case being heard six or eight times, as illustrated in the
labor case cited note 104 supra. From the point of view of the parties involved, not to
mention the legal writers commenting on the decisions, the certainty of the new statutory
provisions is outweighed by the hazards of the judicial process. Perhaps the eventual
elimination of the political insecurity which probably provided the justification for this
elaborate control mechanism in early practice, coupled with an increasing supply of
higher quality personnel with better training for the legal system, will lead to a decision
in the not too distant future in favor of increased security of decision.
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